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A BATTLE OVER BIRTH "CONTROL":
LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE EMPLOYER PRESCRIPTION
CONTRACEPTION BENEFIT MANDATES*
Under the PregnancyDiscriminationAct (PDA), employers areprohibitedfrom
discriminatingagainstwomen by treatingpregnancy and childbirthdifferentfrom
other medicalconditions. Employers who offer medical benefits to their employees
have thus been required to cover pregnancy-relatedmedical costs on the same
terms as othermedical coverage. The cost ofprescriptioncontraception,however,
has generally not been covered by employer-sponsored medicalplans, even while
other prescriptiondrugs were. This Note examines the recent case of Erickson v.
Bartell Drug Co., which challenged this practice of excluding prescription
contraceptioncoverage as discriminatoryunder the PDA, andargues thatfurther
federal legislation is necessary to ensure the equal treatment of women in the
workplace.

INTRODUCTION
In June 2001, Judge Robert S. Lasnik, of the Western District of Washington
reached the groundbreaking conclusion that, under federal law, if an employer
offers a prescription drug benefit to its employees and their dependents, it must
include coverage for prescription contraceptives.' In itself, such a ruling might
seem unremarkable. In a historical context, however, it is quite an extraordinary
accomplishment, as it would seem that women have taken a large step forward on
the ever-shortening road to full legal equality. And what could be seen as the "final
frontier" in the fight for unfettered reproductive freedom has been reached. 2
Having achieved suffrage in the early twentieth century, women were finally

* This Essay is dedicated to my beautiful wife Trish, who brought this matter to my
attention. Thank you for your unwavering support and boundless love.
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
2 Of course, it is not meant to be exerted that the fight for gender equality or full
reproductive freedom is over. Unfortunately, attitudes and social structures do not change
quickly, even though the law may pivot on a dime. At least in terms of legal reproductive
freedom, however, in a thumbnail, women (and men for that matter, at least those who are
one-half of a "couple") have the right to have sex while limiting the risk of pregnancy, the
right to terminate a pregnancy in the its early stages, the guarantee that one will not be fired
if one chooses to have a child, and now finally, to require their employers, if they offer a drug
benefit package, to pay for the means by which women control all of the proceeding
functions. This is no small feat.
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granted legislative equality via Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' On paper,
women were to be treated the same as men - most notably, for the purposes of this
Essay, in the realm of employment.
As is often the case, however, with most legislation that is designed to
magically affect longstanding attitudes with a simple ceremonious bill signing, Title
VII, as it was enacted, did not anticipate all of the pernicious ways in which gender
discrimination can rear its ugly head. Though it was designed to make men and
women coequals, it was flawed for that very reason. Of course, men and women are
not the same, especially because of their differing functions in the process of
procreation.
In 1976, when the General Electric Company's employer benefit package did
not carve out benefits as they related to pregnancy, the Supreme Court concluded
that, because female employees received the exact same benefits as their male
counterparts, facial equality was achieved.4 Such a literal interpretation of Title VII
ignored the realities of biology, exploited the infirmities in the drafting of the law,
and disregarded the best intentions of those who passed such a momentous piece of
legislation.
Responding directly to that Supreme Court decision, Congress passed the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)5 in 1978, recognizing that, in order to ensure
true employment equity, legislation must account for the differences inherent in our
respective biological compositions. The PDA required employers to account not
just for the actuality, but for the possibility, that a female employee could become
pregnant. Although the PDA never mentioned contraception specifically, in
retrospect it would not have required a large logical leap to think that it compelled
employers who offered their employees drug benefits to have included in that
benefit coverage for female prescription contraception. Inexplicably, it took
twenty-three years not just for a court to rule that the PDA covers contraception, but
for an employee to even challenge the exclusion of such a benefit from her
employer-sponsored drug plan.6
One might ask why such a conclusion matters. At first blush, it seems trivial
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000)).
4 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2000)).
6 Although the article "her" is being used in this context, male employees who have
female dependants also have standing to raise such issues. See, e.g., Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (finding that a health insurance
plan covering pregnancy-related costs for female employees while spouses of male
employees were not covered violated the PDA); EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., No. CIV 002229 (D. Minn. 2001) (consent decree) (on file with author) (reaching a settlement in which
a male employee sued for the out-of-pocket expenses he and his wife incurred in buying
prescription contraception over the course of seven years).
3
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that a relatively reasonable out-of-pocket expense is now covered under insurance.
Delve deeper, however, and one will see that it is about choices and power.
Prescription contraception can cost over $300 a year.7 For some women or couples,
that amount may be significant, and it becomes a choice between "risking it" or
adding it to the long list of monthly bills that must be paid. However, when the
expenses of contraception coverage are pooled, the increase in cost to employers
and employees is negligible and, in fact, saves enormous costs in other areas where
employers have either voluntarily extended coverage or were forced to do so by the
PDA.' Additionally, when the total effect of unintended pregnancy is examined, it
becomes apparent that society as a whole greatly benefits when women of
childbearing age have unfettered access to prescription contraceptives.'
Even in light of the above discussion, it is estimated that forty-nine percent of
all health care plans still do not offer prescription contraceptives.10 "[W]hereas
most drugs approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) appear almost
immediately on health plans... [o]ral contraceptives are the only class of FDAapproved prescriptions routinely excluded from insurance coverage."" And,
because men do not require such prescriptions, "women pay 63 to 68 percent higher
out-of-pocket healthcare costs than men... (with) [a]lmost 5 million privatelyinsured women between the ages of 14 and 44 hav[ing] out-of-pocket health
expenditures exceeding 10 percent of income."' 2
7 Rowena Bonoan & Dr. Julianna S. Gonen, Family Health, FAMILY HEALTH, Aug.
2000, at 5.
' See JACQUELINE E. DARROCH, COST TO EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS OF COVERING
CONTRACEPTIVES: SUMMARY, METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND (1998) ("The added cost

for employers of providing this coverage corresponds to $1.43 per month, which represents
a mean increase of less than 1% in employers' costs of providing employees with medical
coverage."), available at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/kaiser_0698.html.
9 See infra text accompanying Laylocks 78-94.
'0 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal Rptr. 2d 176, 181
(Ct. App. 2001), review granted, 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001); Sylvia A. Law, Sex
DiscriminationandInsurancefor Contraception,73 WASH. L. REV. 363,372 (1998) (citing
ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., UNEVEN & UNEQUAL: INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REPRODUCTIVE

HEALTH SERVICES 12 (1995)).

Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181-82.
Id. at 182. The court was alluding to the study conducted in 1994 by the Women's
Research and Education Institute which posited that, due in large part to their functions as
potential bearers of children, women of reproductive age spend sixty-eight percent more in
out-of-pocket health care costs than men. WOMEN'S RESEARCH AND EDUCATION INSTITUTE,
WOMEN'S HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS AND EXPERIENCES 2 (1994). This has been referred
to as a "gender tax" by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, member of the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. Improving Women's Health: Why Contraceptive
InsuranceCoverageMatters:HearingonS. 104 Before the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor,
and Pensions, 107th Cong. 4-5 (2001) [hereinafter Hearing](statement of Senator Barbara
A. Mikulski).
"

12
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The question then becomes: If it makes economic sense, why do an enormous
number of benefit plans still not offer prescription contraception coverage, even in
the wake of a groundswell of support? 3 The answer may reveal an unflattering
picture of the power structure that dominates this country. Employers choose what
coverage their benefit packages will offer, and, because the upper echelons of
Corporate America are overwhelmingly male, it is easy to deduce why prescription
contraception coverage is still not the norm.14 This point is highlighted by the fact
that in 1998, two months after Viagra became available in the United States, more
than half of all Viagra prescriptions in this country received some insurance
reimbursement. It took forty years for oral contraceptives to attain the same level
of coverage."I
Whether the absence of such benefits is a manifestation of a conscious moral
policy decreed from upon high or a genuine lack of empathy 6 and understanding
from those in the decision-making loop, many women in this country are forced to
pay (or not pay, as is often the case) for contraceptives even though all other
prescriptions are covered. Given that Corporate America has been slow to react and
that any gains resulting from lawsuits are only directly applicable to the parties in
each particular case, legislation is the key to ensuring that women are reimbursed
for choosing to employ prescription birth control. So far, two-fifths of the states
have chosen to enact an insurance mandate, and the federal government has had
similar legislation pending for three years.
This Note argues that federal legislation is imperative to ensure that full
There is no doubt that the use of contraception has become such an accepted practice
in our culture and an integral part of our society, that even the American Life League
acknowledges that trying to outlaw contraception would be impossible. "We would have
more success if we were to dig a hole in the sand and attempt to empty an ocean into that
hole. After all, legal or not, the practice of contraception has become a social behavior that
is accepted." Position Paper, Am. Life League, Birth Control: Contraceptive Compromise
[hereinafter Position Paper, Birth Control], at http://www.all.org/issues/nr07.htrn (last visited
Nov. 13, 2002). In fact, as of 1995, 85.1 percent of all women (including 81.2 percent of
Catholics) between the ages of twenty and forty-four have used oral contraceptives.
DARROCH, supra ten days, at 6, at 9. And it is not just women that support wider access to
coverage - one poll found that "eight in ten Americans, both male and female, would
13

support insurance coverage of contraceptives up to a hypothetical increase of five dollars per
month." Sarah E. Bycott, Note, ControversyAroused:North CarolinaMandatesInsurance
Coverage of Contraceptivesin the Wake of Viagra, 79 N.C. L. REV. 779, 783 (2001).
" The implication is not that it is easy to understand, but simply that the cause and effect
are quite clear.
" Amy Goldstein, Viagra 'sSuccess Fuels GenderBiasDebate:Birth ControlAdvocates
Raise Issue, WASH. POST, May 20, 1998, at Al. Coverage for diaphragms and IUDs has yet
to reach this mark. Id.
16 This term is not necessarily meant to be employed in a pejorative way but instead
simply as a means to point out the very obvious: a man simply does not know what it means

to be a woman (and of course vice versa).
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contraceptive equality is achieved. The decision in Erickson v. Bartell, though
revolutionary and a legitimate reflection of contemporary society, is not necessarily
on firm legal footing as the PDA is silent on the matter of contraception. Though
many state legislatures have succeeded where the federal government has failed,
state mandates do not have the same reach as a federal directive. Thus many
women in those enlightened states are still left unprotected.
While it may seem unlikely given the current composition of Congress that such
a bill will ever see the light of day, it is almost universally recognized that health
care costs are spiraling out of control. Not only does this affect the vast majority
of Americans directly, but also indirectly as cash-strapped states feel the economic
burden of maintaining Medicare and Medicaid. Therefore, the only convincing
argument that would be effective at this time in Washington would be not that it is
the right thing to do, but that it makes economic sense. This Note attempts to
present all of the evidence to support that position.
Finally, one of the perils of such legislative action will be examined: the
inevitable collision of ideals between the mandate to achieve equality and
religiously affiliated employers that object to contraception on the basis of
conscience. One such case is currently making its way through the California court
system and provides us with a dynamic analysis of First Amendment doctrine."
The outcome of this case is important because, where the California legislation has
created a religious exemption, the proposed federal legislation has no such
exclusion.
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS

ACT OF 1964

Prior to 1964, the only measures the federal government could take in
eliminating employment discrimination were in its own hiring and awarding of
contracts to nongovernmental entities. 8
Executive Orders addressing
discrimination in federal hiring were initiated during the administration of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, and decrees involving government contracts were promulgated
from the White House beginning with the Truman administration.' 9 Any attempts
to broaden such ideals through federal legislation were invariably stalled and
inevitably thwarted. The only legislative success in this area was realized in a
handful of states.2"
It was not until the death of President Kennedy that Congress felt the need to
'7 Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Ct.App. 2001), review granted,31 P.3d
1271 (Cal. 2001).

"S U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

TITLES VII & XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3 (1968).
19 Id. at 1-3.
20 Id. at 1.
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extend the ideal of equality. As a tribute to the slain President who championed
civil rights more than any of his predecessors, President Johnson made the passing
of the Civil Rights Act a priority.2 Gender equality, however, was not the same
hot-button issue as was race at the time. All executive action prior to the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 dealt exclusively with race or religion; gender
equality was not part of the original legislative proposal.22 Gender was included in
the Act at the last minute when a Congressman from Virginia offered an amendment
that passed through the House of Representatives by a vote of 168 to 13323
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from
discriminating "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 2 4 This proscription extends to the benefit
packages an employer offers to its employees, including health insurance, because
such benefits are seen as compensatory.25 Title VII prohibits both intentional
discrimination (unless it is a "bona fide occupational qualification") and defacto
discrimination manifested by policies that are "neutral in form but discriminatory
in effect. 26
To establish a prima facie disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must show
that the challenged employment practices "in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another, without justification ... ." Once a plaintiff has
established a prima facie case that a policy has a disproportionate
adverse impact upon women, the employer may defend the policy by
showing it is justified by business necessity.27

21
22
23

Id. at 10.

Id. at 3-10.

Id. at 10. The opinion inErickson v. BartellDrug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D.
Wash. 2001), suggests that the powerful Representative Smith might have proposed the
amendment in an attempt to create another controversial hurdle to be overcome in the passing
of the legislation. Whatever the impetus for his proposing the amendment, it is known that
Smith voted against final passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1269.
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
25 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)
(establishing that such benefits are "conditions" and/or "privileges of employment").
2'6 Law, supra note 10, at 374 (citing Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d
674,
681 (8th Cir. 1996)).
27 Id. at 374-75 (quoting Krauel, 95 F.3d at 681, and citing Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433
U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977)) (footnotes omitted). The author goes on to say: "It is difficult to
imagine how an employer could show that 'business necessity' requires excluding
prescription contraceptive services from insurance coverage." Law, supra note 10, at 375.

2002]

PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTION BENEFIT MANDATES
GENERAL ELECTRIC V. GILBERT

In 1976 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a suit brought against
General Electric (GE) in which the plaintiff argued that GE's failure to provide
disability benefits arising from pregnancy violated Title VH. 28 The majority of the
Court, led by Justice Rehnquist, found that the plaintiffs failed to show "that the
financial benefits of the Plan 'worked to discriminate against any definable group
or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from
the program."' '29 Justice Rehnquist went on to write:
The Plan, in effect.., is nothing more than an insurance package, which
covers some risks, but excludes others. The "package" [in its coverage
of male and female employees] covers exactly the same categories of
risk, and is facially nondiscriminatory in the sense that "[tihere is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no
risk from which women are protected and men are not." As there is no
proof that the package is in fact worth more to men than to women, it is
impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this scheme
simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive
benefits; that is to say, gender-based discrimination does not result
simply because an employer's disability-benefits plan is less than allinclusive.... [P]regnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional
risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk
does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men
and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion
of risks.30
However, a vigorous dissent by Justice Brennan in Gilbert pointed out that the
majority's ruling was contrary to the findings of six Courts of Appeals that ruled on
the subject and guidelines published by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) in 1972."' Justice Brennan stated that the EEOC ruling in
particular should have been afforded "great deference" because that is the very
raison di'tre of the commission - to carry out the mandate of Title VII. 32 To
Justice Brennan, evidence that the EEOC spent seven years promulgating
28

General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1976), superseded by Pregnancy

Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
2000e(k) (2000)).
29 Id. at 138 (quoting Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,496 (1974)).
30 Id. at 138-39 (quoting Gedulig,417 U.S. at 496-97) (citations and footnotes omitted).
31 Id. at 146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 155-58.
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pregnancy-oriented policy according to its own interpretation of Title VII was
particularly illustrative of the deliberate and thorough nature of its findings. 3
Justice Brennan gave a backhanded defense for GE's disability policy in saying
that, like so many other companies, it was devised in a different era when women
were not as strong a presence in the workforce. 4 For Justice Brennan, Gilbert was
clearly an opportunity to adopt a progressive interpretation of the Civil Rights Act
that reflected modem society.
An additional dissent by Justice Stevens was just as persuasive. He concluded
that the Court was creating a class of persons that was at risk - those who are
absent due to pregnancy." "By definition, such a rule discriminates on account of
sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the
female from the male."36 Justice Stevens argued that discrimination "analysis is the
same whether the rule relates to hiring, promotion, the acceptability of an excuse
for absence, or an exclusion from a disability insurance plan." 37
THE PDA
The incongruous ruling by the Supreme Court in Gilbert and the compelling
dissents found therein mobilized Congress to create the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA)38 to directly circumvent the Court's ruling.39 The PDA amended the
definitions section of Title VII and added:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work...."
The effect of the PDA was to identify "pregnancy discrimination" as being
discrimination on the basis of gender. The PDA, however, does not require that
employers treat pregnancy leave differently than any other type of leave offered to
3 Id. at
Id. at
35 Id. at
36 Id. at
14

156-57.
159-60.
161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161-62.

37 Id.at 162.
38

Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).

39 HAROLD S.LEWIS, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 199

(1997).
40

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
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all of its employees for any other medical conditions."'
A RULING FROM THE

EEOC

Despite Congress' relatively quick reaction decrying the Supreme Court's
ruling in Gilbert, the EEOC did not rule that the PDA requires prescription
contraception to be offered under otherwise comprehensive drug plans until
December 14, 2000.42
In its decision, the EEOC bolstered its position by citing a more contemporary
Supreme Court case, UA Wv. Johnson Controls,Inc.43 In that case, the Court found
that classifying employees merely on the basis of their capacity to have children is
sex-discrimination, regardless of whether they are pregnant. 4" "Under the Court's
analysis, the fact that it is women, rather than men, who have the ability to become
pregnant cannot be used to penalize them in any way, including in. the terms and
' The
conditions of their employment."45
Commission went on to say:
Contraception is a means by which a woman controls her ability to
become pregnant. The PDA's prohibition on discrimination against
women based on their ability to become pregnant thus necessarily
includes a prohibition on discrimination related to a woman's use of
contraceptives. Under the PDA, for example, Respondents could not
discharge an employee from her job because she uses contraceptives.
So, too, Respondents may not discriminate in their health insurance plan
by denying benefits for prescription contraceptives when they provide
benefits for comparable drugs and devices.... [T]he PDA's prohibition
of discrimination in connection with a woman's ability to become
pregnant necessarily includes the denial of benefits for contraception. 6

LEWIS, supra note 39, at 199 ("[T]he amendment's dominant principle is
nondiscrimination, rather than preference."). Individual state statutes granting longer leaves
for pregnancy, however, were determined by the Supreme Court not to be preempted by the
41

PDA because such grants are in keeping with thepurposeofthe PDA. See UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
42 Comm'n Decision on Coverage of Contraception, 2000 WL 33407187 (Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n (Dec. 14, 2000)) [hereinafter EEOC Decision].
43499 U.S. 187 (1991).
44Id. at 1210.
4' EEOC Decision at

*2(holding that female employees of childbearing age could not be
discriminated against from being employed in an area of the company where exposure would

place a pregnant woman and her baby in grave danger) (citing Johnson Controls, 499 U.S.
at 199,211).
46 Id. at *2-*3.
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In EEOC Decision, the EEOC reasoned that Congress' failure to explicitly
mention contraception spoke volumes because it had expressly limited the PDA's
applicability to abortion. 47 Among those items the EEOC believed that Congress
attempted to address was the assumption that female employees would become
pregnant.48 "Congress thus prohibited discrimination against women based on 'the
whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process,' and gave women 'the
right. . . to be financially and legally protected before, during, and after [their]
pregnancies.'"9
The Commission therefore stated that its interpretation of the PDA was the
clearest manifestation of Congress' intent when it enacted the amendment to
provide equal standing to men and women in their capacities of being either actual
or potential employees." Such a ruling, then, would ensure that women would not
be deprived of equality because of their status as actual or potential bearers of
children.

A NEW ERA
In 1998, Professor Sylvia Law observed that, "if excluding contraception from
employment-based health insurance is pervasive, damaging, and illegal (in other
words, a slam-dunk legal argument), no one has noticed or asserted it."'" On June
12, 2001, twenty-three years after the PDA was enacted to amend the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the first case to adopt Law's argument was decided. In Erickson v.
Bartell Drug Co.,2 Jennifer Erickson, a Seattle pharmacist for the Bartell Drug
Company, challenged the status quo. 3 Ms. Erickson not only was unable to receive
benefit coverage from her own health plan for prescription contraceptives, but
through her profession she encountered many women each day who faced the same
problem.
In September of 2001, Ms. Erickson testified in front of Congress and
elucidated her motivation for filing suit:
Contraception is one of the most common prescriptions I fill for women.
I am often the person who has the difficult job of telling a woman that
her insurance plan will not cover contraceptives. It is an unenviable and
frustrating position to be in, because the woman is often upset and
4 Id. at *3.
48

Id.

Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. H38, 574 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1978)) (footnote omitted) (alterations in original).
41

Id. at *3.
s'Law, supra note 10, at 364.
52 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
50

3 See id.
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disappointed, and I am unable to give her an acceptable explanation.
Why? Because there is no acceptable explanation for this shortsighted
policy. All I could say was, "I don't know why it's not covered. My
54
pills aren't covered either and it doesn't make any sense to me.
Erickson's befuddlement was constrained compared to the many women's groups
that became outraged when the drug Viagra became available to help cure male
impotence." Many drug plans began offering coverage for Viagra while continuing
to deny prescriptive contraception coverage. Though Erickson and the various
feminist groups may have had different motivations, their argument was basically
the same: not offering prescription contraception coverage was not only genderbiased and based on antiquated sexual and chauvinistic beliefs, but more
specifically, it violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
In ruling that withholding contraception coverage for female employees and
dependents of male employees is discriminatory, the court in Erickson itself
remarked:
Employers in general, and Bartell in particular, might justifiably wonder
why, when Title VII has been on the books for thirty-seven years, this
Court is only now holding that it includes a right to prescription
contraceptives in certain circumstances. The answer, of course, is that
until this case, no court had been asked to evaluate the common practice
of excluding contraceptives from a generally comprehensive health plan
under Title VII.
Adopted as part of its defense then, Bartell argued that there was no precedent for
the court to rule that female employees are entitled to prescription contraception
coverage if the employer is to offer a generally comprehensive drug plan. Judge
Lasnik retorted: "While there are a number of possible explanations for the lack of
litigation over this issue, none of them changes the fact that, having now been
properly raised as a matter of statutory construction, this Court is constitutionally

4 Hearing,supranote 12, at 38-39 (statement of Jennifer Erickson, Pharmacist, Bartell
Drug Co.).
" See generally Bycott, supra note 13, at 779 (discussing the outrage expressed by
women toward the speed at which Viagra became available); Goldstein, supranote 15. It was
noted in the court's opinion in Erickson that Bartell's prescription benefit plan did not
include coverage for Viagra. In an interesting twist, and conceiving an issue that must wait
for another day, the court noted in dicta that "such an exclusion may later be determined to
violate male employees' rights under Title VII. This issue is not before the Court." Erickson,
141 F. Supp. 2dat 1275 n.12.
56 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
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required to rule on the issue before it." 7
ERICKSON V. BARTELL DRUG CO.

In his analysis, Judge Lasnik noted that the PDA does not specifically cover
prescription contraceptives. Undaunted, he boldly asserted that, because the PDA
was a direct result of the Gilbert decision and an adoption ofJustices Brennan's and
Steven's respective dissents, a "broader interpretation" of Title VII is required. 8
Title VII requires employers not only to recognize "that there are sex-based
differences between men and women employees, but also require[s] employers to
provide women-only benefits or otherwise incur additional expenses on behalf of
59
women in order to treat the sexes the same.,
The court went on to note that the facts in Erickson regarding the coverage'that
Bartell offered its employees in essence matched those in Gilbert. The similarities
were that:
An employer has chosen to offer an employment benefit which excludes
from its scope of coverage services which are available only to women.
All of the services covered by the policy are available to both men and
women, so, as was the case in Gilbert, "[tihere is no risk from which
men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from
which women are protected and men are not.""
Judge Lasnik remarked, however, that one major difference compelled him to reach
a different conclusion than the United States Supreme Court did twenty-five years
earlier: timing. The Gilbert decision came before (or rather begat) the PDA, and
"the intent of Congress in enacting the PDA, even if not the exact language used in
the amendment, shows that mere facial parity of coverage does not excuse orjustify
an exclusion which carves out benefits that are uniquely designed for women."'
The Erickson case's groundbreaking proclamation established that Title VII, as
it is amended by the PDA:
is not a begrudging recognition of a limited grant of rights to a strictly
defined group of women who happen to be pregnant.... [I]t is a broad
acknowledgement of the intent of Congress to outlaw any and all
discrimination against any and all women in the terms and conditions of
5' Id. (footnote omitted).
8

d. at 1270.

59 Id.

6

Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976)).

61

Id. at 1271.
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their employment, including the benefits an employer provides to its
employees. Male and female employees have different, sex-based
disability and healthcare needs, and the law is no longer blind to the fact
that only women can get pregnant, bear children, or use prescription
contraception. The special or increased healthcare needs associated with
a woman's unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the same
extent, and on the same terms, as other healthcare needs. Even if one
were to assume that Bartell's prescription plan was not the result of
intentional discrimination,6 2 the exclusion of women-only benefits from
a generally comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination under
63
Title VII.
Though Title VII in no way requires employers to offer any type of benefit, when
an employer chooses to offer prescription drug coverage, it must legally do so in a
64
way that is equally comprehensive to both sexes.
Bartell argued that, because the PDA did not specifically cover contraception,
but rather only "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," its drug plan
was not contrary to the statute. Despite that argument, and in what is one of the
major focuses of appeal, Judge Lasnik boldly stated:
Having reviewed the legislative history of the PDA, it is clear that in
1978 Congress had no specific intent regarding coverage for prescription
contraceptives. The relevant issue, however, is whether the decision to
exclude drugs made for women from a generally comprehensive
prescription plan is sex discrimination under Title VII, with or without
the clarification provided by the PDA. The Court finds that, regardless
of whether the prevention of pregnancy falls within the phrase
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," Congress'
decisive overruling of General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert evidences an
interpretation of Title VII which necessarily precludes the choices
Bartell has made in this case.65
That, in fact, was not argued at all. Judge Lasnik simply remarked that the plan was
undoubtedly a relic based on an antiquated notion of the female gender's impact in, and
contribution to, the workforce. Id. at 1271 n.7. In actuality, Bartell was in the process of
adding coverage of female prescription contraception to its plan before the suit was filed.
Ironically it was the filing of the suit that reportedly forced them to shelf the idea. Carol M.
Ostrom, Judge:Add Birth Controlto Bartell'sHealthPlan, SEATrLE TIMES, June 13, 2001,
at Al, availableat 200.1 WL 3512036. In addition, before the decision had come down, its
union employees had already received the coverage through collective bargaining. Id.
63 Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72.
64 Id. at 1272.
65 Id. at 1274 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
62
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There is little doubt that one of the greatest objects of criticism in Erickson is
its broad interpretation of the PDA in relation to Title VII. In the above quoted
passage, Judge Lasnik is applying a contemporary judicial amendment to a law that
he views as being slightly out of date. He seems to imply that, if Congress were to
have enacted the PDA today, it would include contraception coverage, so the Court
may as well read it into the Act after consulting Title VII. Though it is enlightened
and ideal, the assertion is a bold one, prone to attack.
Precedent to broadly construe the PDA, however, is on the side of Judge
Lasnik. When faced with a similar incident of ambiguity in Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,66 the Supreme Court decided against
reading the PDA narrowly. In that case, the majority held that pregnancy benefits
to the female spouses of employees that were inferior to those given to female
employees were discriminatory under the PDA.67 This despite the fact, as the
dissent so stridently pointed out, that the language in the PDA only specifically refers
to "employees."6 As Sylvia Law observed: "The majority recognized instead that
the language of the PDA reflects a broad remedial purpose. In short, the PDA
broadly requires employers to treat equally pregnancy and pregnancy-related
conditions for which benefits are provided to an employee or his or her otherwise
'69
qualified dependents.
THE BARTELL APPEAL -

INCREASED COSTS OR A FIGHT FOR CONTROL?

As may be expected, though generally hailed as a step in the right direction by
most women's groups, Erickson has been met with criticism from other fronts,
especially religious groups and conservatives.7" Putting aside for a moment the
inevitable head-on collision with some powerful religious sects, it is argued that
requiring equal access to drug benefits will cost insurance companies and employers
billions of dollars.' I The fear is that governmental intervention into the free market
may cause many employers to take away drug benefits from all employees
altogether because of rising costs." With the advent of fertility drugs, impotence
drugs and the many drugs we are most certain to see in the future that are genderspecific, it is argued that dropping drug benefits entirely may end up being the only

66

462 U.S. 669 (1983).

67

Id. at 685.

68

Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

69

Law, supra note 10, at 378.

70

See a sampling of issues causing consternation from the perspective of the Christus

Medicus foundation at http://www.cmfoudnation.com/EPICC/epicchtm (last visited Jan. 23,
2003).

7' See infra notes 75 and 97.
72 Infra note 97.
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facially neutral solution possible to ward off the inevitable slippery slope.73
As the lawyers who defended UPS in a similar suit and negotiated the
settlement in EEOC v. United Parcel Service74 that extended prescription
contraception coverage to its employees and their dependents argued:
Few, if any, employers can afford to provide health plans that cover any
and all treatments ....[F]or the thirty-seven years since the passage of
Title VII, employers have been making numerous cost/benefit decisions
on whether to include or exclude various medical treatments ....

If

Judge Lasnik's reasoning is adopted by other federal courts, employers
are going to be subjected to extensive litigation and potentially billions
in additional costs for their health plans."
At first, of course, the impact would be additional costs to employers. However,
estimates show that the increase would only be approximately one percent." That
fact is generally recognized by parties on both sides of the argument.77
Id.
No. CIV 00-2229 PAM JGL (D. Minn. 2001) (consent decree) (on file with author).
7'Howard Shapiro & Robert Rachal, Federal Court Issues Decision That May Cost
73
7'

Health Plans Billions,

MCCALLA

E-NEWS

UPDATE,

June

13,

2001,

at

http://www.mtphs.com/newsletters/E-Newsletters/e-News-Updates/GenL&E-e-news-PDA-613-01.htm. Note that the argument is not that contraception coverage itself will cost
employers a significant amount, but that legislatures are getting into the habit of making
decrees and the aggregate of other mandates surely has increased costs, and will continue to
do so until they spiral out of control. In addition, a legal system that is receptive to employee
challenges to an employer's plan will create prohibitive defense costs in litigation matters.
76 Darroch, supra note 8, at 1. The Alan Guttmacher Institute commissioned Buck
Consultants, an employee benefit, actuarial, and compensation consulting firm, to analyze
the costs of covering prescription contraception. Id. at 1.Of the $21.40 increase in total costs
(including administrative costs and covering employees and dependents) it was assumed that
the employee would absorb $4.28 or twenty percent based on the average co-pay in such drug
benefit plans, leaving $17.12 to be covered by the employer. Id. Information was obtained
from six pharmacy benefit managers that represented 150 million insured people in the
United States to determine that the average number of contraception prescriptions (including
oral contraceptives, diaphragms, injectables, implants and IUDs) per employee was 0.80591.
That number was then multiplied by the average cost per prescription, $27.77, to arrive at
the $21.40. Id. at 2-3. Almost eighty percent of that cost was attributed to oral
contraception, otherwise known as "the pill," the most expensive form of contraception. Id.
at 3.
77For example, Bartell in its appeal made no assertions at all that the Erickson result
would foist increased costs upon employers and insurance companies. On the contrary, the
appellate brief stressed how low the out-of-pocket expenses would be to Ms. Erickson and
her husband and others like them: "Far from being a 'gaping hole' in her benefits coverage,
the lack of prescription birth control coverage does not 'cause a materially adverse change
in the terms and conditions of employment,' and thus is not substantial enough to constitute
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The immediate costs are negligible and far outweighed by the eventual savings
that employers should expect to realize. The fact that many health plans do not
offer prescription drug coverage is thought to contribute to the alarmingly high rate
of unintended pregnancy in this country.78 Given that it is estimated that almost
sixty percent of pregnancies in the United States are unplanned,79 theoretically,
employers are destined to see savings."
The consequences of each ofthese unplanned pregnancies can be enormous, not
just to each woman who finds herself in such a position, but also to society as a
whole. First, because the parents are ill-prepared in such instances, children of
unwanted pregnancies are more susceptible to infant mortality and morbidity"' and
more likely to be a burden on society.82 This is nothing new. Medicaid realized
an adverse action." Brief for Appellant at 15, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d
1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (No. 00-1213L). In addition, the testimony of Kate Sullivan, on
behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at the same Congressional hearings in which
Jennifer Erickson appeared, did not strongly dispute the assumption that there will be
nominal costs to employers and certainly offered no evidence to the contrary. See Hearings,
supra note 16, at 42-45 (statement of Kate Sullivan, Director, Health Care Policy, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce).
78

Law, supra note 10, at 364.

COMM. ON UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, INST. OF MED., THE BEST INTENTIONS:
UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 1 (Sarah S.
9

Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995) [hereinafter BEST INTENTIONS]; DARROCH, supranote
8, at 6 ("Some 3.04 million women experience an unintended pregnancy each year.... Some
53% of these unintended pregnancies are among women who experienced contraceptive
failure. . . and 47% are among those who were not using any method during the month they
conceived."); Bonoan & Gonen, supra note 7, at 1 ("Forty-eight percent of women of
reproductive age (15-44) had at least one unplanned pregnancy, 28% had one or more
unplanned births, 30% had one or more abortions and 11% had both.").
80

See EEOC Decision, supra note 12, at n. 18 (describing the assumption as "common

sense"); WILLIAM M. MERCER INC., WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE ISSUES: CONTRACEPTION AS A

COVERED BENEFrr 5 (1999) ("[F]or every tax dollar used for contraception, Medicaid saves

$4.40 in medical costs and social services cost."). See also James Trussell et al., The
Economic Value of Contraception:A Comparison of 15 Methods, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1995); James Trussell et al., Medical Care Cost Savings From
Adolescent ContraceptiveUse, 29 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVE (1997). To be fair, this

is the assumption upon which many of those favoring benefit coverage rely, if for no more
reason than it intuitively would seem to be true. One commentator suggests, however, that
this is not yet a truism as most access studies have focused on developing countries and not
the United States. See Bycott, supra note 11, at 784-85 ("Thus far.., no studies have been
conducted exploring the validity of this basic assumption upon which much of the cost-

benefit analysis in favor of contraceptive coverage hinges.").
81 BEST INTENTIONS, supra note 79 at 1 ("The child of an unwanted conception
especially ...is at greater risk of being born at low birthweight, of dying in its first year of

life, of being abused, and of not receiving sufficient resources for healthy development.")
82 See Law, supra note 10, at 365-66 (footnotes omitted):
The adverse effects of unintended pregnancy do not end in infancy. Unwanted
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the benefit of providing access to prescription contraceptives in 1993. Disregarding
the astronomical costs of an unhealthy birth, even a normal delivery averages over
$6,000, while one requiring a cesarean section averages over $10,000.3
All of this is assuming that the pregnancy is not terminated. It has been
estimated that as many as forty-four percent of all of the unintended pregnancies in
this country result in abortion. " In order to reduce the financial and psychological
burdens of the approximately one million women who have resorted to abortion,
contraception has to be more accessible. Conservatives clamor ad nauseum that
abortion and unintended pregnancies have an enormous impact in diminishing our
collective morality, but those very same people seek to limit a woman's access to
a highly effective, and most realistic,85 means of eliminating such social ills.
Considering that contraception can be obtained for as little as $150 a year, the
argument that mandating prescription coverage for contraception would increase
costs to the health insurance industry and thus to employers has been overblown if
not proven to be economically irrational. 6 Casting that aside, however, and
assuming arguendo that mandating coverage would result in increased costs to
employers, Title VII bars such a defense from being raised.
In Erickson, Judge Lasnik addressed this issue as a result of Bartell having
argued that an extension of contraception coverage to female employees would take
the employers' power of controlling the costs of drug benefit plans out of their
hands. The Court noted that Title VII contains no opt-out provision on the basis of
cost:
While it is undoubtedly true that employers may cut benefits, raise
children and adolescents are nearly twice as likely as wanted children to receive
psychiatric care for both mild and severe psychological disorders. In addition,
they are twice as likely to have a record ofjuvenile delinquency and three times
more likely to have a record of adult criminal activity.
83 Diana Korte, VaginalBirth After Cesarean:A Primerfor Success, MOTHERING, July
1998, at 54 ("in 1995, a hospital vaginal birth averaged $6,378, and a cesarean, $10,678,
according to the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists."); see also Bonoan
& Gonen, supra note 7, at 1 ("[For a] woman engaged in regular sexual activity ... use of
no contraceptive method over 5 years results in 4.25 unintended pregnancies at a cost of
$14,663.").
84 Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, The Role of HormonalContraceptives:Epidemiology of
Unintended Pregnancy and Contraceptive Use, 170 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY

1485, 1485 (1994).
85 As opposed to the ongoing campaign to promote abstinence as the only method to ward
off unintended pregnancies.
86 See Bycott, supra note 13, at 788 (discussing the relative prevalence of insurance
coverage for childbirth and abortion); James Trussell et al., supra note 81, at 494, 500 (1995)
(providing data based on a theoretical five year study of various contraceptives and the
number of pregnancies each would prevent relative to the cost of each).
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deductibles, or otherwise alter coverage options to comply with
budgetary constraints, the method by which the employer seeks to curb
costs must not be discriminatory .... Although Bartell is permitted,
under the law, to use non-discriminatory cuts in benefits to control costs,
it cannot balance its benefit books at the expense of its female
employees.87
Because Title VII mandates equality regardless of the extra costs incurred by
employers, such an argument should inevitably not be entertained - but only if
contraceptionis deemed to be within the scope of the PDA. The insurance industry
and those similarly situated have thus appealed to the lawmakers. In turn, they may
ultimately settle this issue, either by enacting legislation mandating coverage or by
continuing to do nothing in the hopes that Bartell and other employers, the number
of which is bound to increase dramatically, find more sympathetic ears in other
courts.
Another aspect of this case is the nature of contraception as a drug. Though
pregnancy and all that medically goes along with it, from pre-natal care to birth, are
"medical conditions" that require the extension of health care benefits under the
PDA, some argue that the potentialto become pregnant is not a medical condition.8
Rather, it is a normal state for most women. To many, what sets Viagra and
prescription contraception apart is that the former is arguably designed to correct
a condition that places the sufferer outside of the norm, 9 whereas the latter is
merely designed to facilitate a lifestyle.9"
And "[t]he insurance industry
traditionally has denied coverage for procedures or medications viewed as elective

Erickson v. Bartell Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
See Brief for Appellant at 27, Erickson (No. 00-1213L) ("The capacity to become
pregnant is not a 'medical condition' as this phrase was used in the PDA, or as commonly
understood. To conclude otherwise would mean that the capacity to become sick, which
every person shares, is also a 'medical condition."').
89 An alternative interpretation, adopted by many insurance companies and employers,
is that erectile dysfunction is a normal condition of aging, just as the capacity to become
pregnant is a normal condition of being a woman, and impotence treatment itself is a qualityof-life treatment. Bycott, supra note 13, at 795-96.
90 See generallyLisaA. Hayden, GenderDiscriminationWithin the ReproductiveHealth
CareSystem: Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171 (analyzing whether healthcare
inequity truely exists by comparing the intended use of Viagra with the intended use of
contraceptives). To see this argument operate from a more ideologically charged vantage
point, see Domenico Bettinelli, Jr., Opinion:A Tough Pillto Swallow, CATH. WORLD NEWS,
July 24, 2000, at http://www.cwnews.com/Browse/2000/07/13497.htm; Press Release,
Wendy Wright, CONCERNED WOMEN FORAMERICA, Bill Would Force Companies to Pay for
Contraceptives (Sept. 13, 2001), at http://www.cwfa.org/library/misc/2001-0913_contraceptives.shtml.
87

88
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or cosmetic and not medically required - so called 'quality-of-life' treatments."'
Bartell raised the argument in its defense in Erickson that "a woman's ability
to control her fertility differs from the type of illness and disease normally treated
with prescription drugs in such significant respects that it is permissible to treat
prescription contraceptives differently than all other prescription medicines."92 But
Judge Lasnik, in regarding all of the information that has already been cited in this
Note as significant, ruled that contraception availability is important to women,
children and society in general "because it can help to prevent a litany of physical,
emotional, economic and social consequences." 93 Whether thisjustifies classifying
the "potential to become pregnant" as a "medical condition," thus falling within the
ambit of the PDA on the one hand, or a judicially manipulated manifestation of an
idealistic policy stance favoring greater access on the other is certainly the focus of
much debate.94
It is easy to summarize the entire battle as this: Just as this issue of access to
prescription contraception benefits concerns control over one's reproductive rights
or sexual freedom, on the flip side, it also concerns employers' and the insurance
industry's control over the terms of doing business.95 Some have argued that, if the
insurance industry and employers were able to interact freely without government
intervention, health care plans would cost less and be more flexible, and fewer
people would be without health insurance.9 6 In fact, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce will go so far as to blame the sum total of the recent trend of higher
costs as being a "directresult of state legislatures' mandates on insured healthplans
offered by employers."9' 7

9'Bycott, supra note 13, at 795-96. Reverting back to feminist theory for a moment,
there is certainly one sense in which both contraception and Viagra are similar that cannot
be overlooked: "Although Viagra and contraceptives are not medicinally parallel in nature
or fiinction, both provide a degree of control over an individual's sexuality that would
otherwise be absent." Id., at 781.
9' Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
91Id. at 1273.
94See Brief for Appellant at 26-29, Erickson (No. 00-12-13L).
9"For an example of the defense by the insurance industry, see Hearing,supra note 12,
at 44 (statement ofKate Sullivan, Director Health Care Policy, U.S. Chamber ofCommerce):
We make no distinction in our opposition to mandates on the basis of cost,
popularity of the benefit, potential indirect benefit to the company, widespread
coverage already by employers, or regard for the legislators who support the
proposal: The Chamber is an equal opportunity organization when it comes to
just saying "No."
See also Shapiro & Rachal, supranote 75 (arguing that the cost to employers of government
mandated medical coverage is prohibitive).
96 Hearing,supra note 12, at 44 (statement of Kate Sullivan).
97Id. (emphasis added).
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EPICC - A PROPOSED LAW
Though Bartell was going to extend contraception coverage to its employees
before the suit was instituted, it has chosen to appeal the decision. There are
certainly many other parties that are very interested in seeing Bartell prevail at the
appellate level and exploit the perceived "reading in" of prescription contraception
coverage by Judge Lasnik as required by the PDA. Of course, the PDA does not
specifically mention contraception coverage, giving strict constructionists a strong
bit of ammunition should Bartell encounter a like-minded appellate court. In order
to give lasting effect to the Erickson decision, it is crucial that Congress enact
legislation that would make the criticism of the case moot.
The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, chaired by
Senator Edward Kennedy, titled the hearing in which Jennifer Erickson appeared
Improving Women's Health: Why ContraceptiveInsuranceCoverageMatters. The
hearing was convened to provide background testimony for the pending Equity in
Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2001 (EPICC). 9' EPICC
has been on the table for three consecutive Congresses and would codify the
principle that emerged out of the Erickson decision, except, of course, it would
apply to a much larger group of employers. It may be unlikely that the current
Congress will revive the proposal.
EPICC would have amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
0
to require all group
1974 (ERISA) 9 and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA)"'
health plans and health insurers providing insurance coverage to provide
"prescription contraceptive drugs or devices approved by the Food and Drug
Administration [(FDA)] ... if such plan provides benefits for other outpatient
prescription drugs or devices."' °t It would also have required the benefit plan to
cover the incidental health costs related to prescription contraception, most notably
the initial doctor's visit required to obtain the prescription and the annual visits
required to renew it.' 2 Additionally, it would have prevented an employer or group
9' S. 104, 107th Cong. (2001).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). The legislation would add a new section to title I,
part 7, subpart B of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1185-1185(b).
'00 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 300gg-92 (2000). The legislation would add a new section to title
XXVII, part A, subpart 2 of PSHA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4 to §§ 300gg-6.
S. 104 sec. 3(a), § 714(a)(1); id. sec. 4(a), § 2707(a)(1).
102 Id. sec. 3(a), § 714(a)(2); id. sec. 4(a), § 2707(a)(2). Seemingly, for plans that do not
cover routine doctor's visits for preventive care, this would be an additional expense part and
parcel with the increased costs of the enhanced drug benefits package. This point is an
additional bone of contention for Bartell in its appeal, not because of the costs involved, but
because of its purported lack of control over that portion of the expanded benefits. The
Erickson decision also requires the company to cover the costs of these additional expenses
on the same basis the insurance plan would pay for doctor's visits for any other type of
ailment to any other employee. Bartell, in its brief, argues that the court is exceeding its
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plan from denying eligibility based on the potential for using such items.° 3 EPICC
expressly allowed for a drug plan to impose deductibles or coinsurance on the same
basis or in the same proportions it does for other drugs covered. 104
Though EPICC languished on Capitol Hill, it provided a blueprint for much of
the state action that has been seen in the past few years. Twenty states now have
contraceptive equity laws.'0 5 It is also consistent with the drug plan the federal
government has offered its own employees.
Since 1998, the federal government has demanded drug benefit equity within
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), the largest employersponsored health insurance program in the world, ensuring that employees have
access to FDA-approved contraception.0 6 The Bush Administration attempted to
eliminate coverage for contraceptives in its fiscal year 2002 budget, but the
language requiring coverage was subsequently restored by the House
Appropriations Committee."0 7 The Administration appears to have attempted to
eliminate contraceptive coverage for federal employees once again with its fiscal
year 2003 budget proposal,' but the House of Representatives has once again
restored the language requiring coverage. 9
jurisdiction because the decision to offer coverage for these "extra doctor's visits" is not
Bartell's but rather its insurer's which is not party to the suit. Brief for Appellant at 22,
Erickson (No. 00-1213L) ("[T]he district court decided that the Bartell plan violated Title
VII and then ordered Bartell to provide additional benefits under the Blue Shield plan as well
as the Bartell plan... [without a] finding that the plaintiff class lacked equal benefits under
the Blue Shield plan."). Bartell's prescriptionplan is self-funded, so under that logic, the
only way an employee of a company that does not have a self-funded prescription plan could
sue to receive benefits would be to enjoin the insurance company as well.
103 S. 104 sec. 3(a), § 714(b)(l); id. sec. 4(a), § 2707(b)(1).
104 Id. sec. 3(a), § 714(c)(l)(A); id. sec. 4(a), § 2702(c)(1)(A).
"I Adam Sonfield, Twenty States Now Require Contraceptive Insurance Coverage,
ON PUB. POL'Y, Aug. 2002, at 13, available at http://www.agi-

GUTrMACHER REP.

usa.org/pubs/j oumals/gr050312.pdf.
106 See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
sec. 101 (h), § 656, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-530 (prohibiting government funding for contracts
that include prescription drug coverage unless prescription contraceptives are also covered).
'07 Alan Fram, House Panel Votes on Contraceptives,AP ONLINE, July 17, 2001, 2001

WL 24713274; see also Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-67, § 643, 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 514, 555.
108 148 CONG. REC. H795 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jones) ("Again in
2002, the Bush Administration has proposed to end contraceptive coverage for federal
employees. . . ."), 2002 WL 384547. But see Judy Holland, Senators Expect to Deliver
Contraceptive Coverage, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCE, July 13, 2002, at A2 ("Last year
President Bush tried unsuccessfully to eliminate the budget [for contraceptive coverage], but
he has not made that effort this year."), 2002 WL 5937529.
"o See Treasury and Government Appropriations Act, 2003, H.R. 5120, 107th Cong. §
635 (2002).
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Erickson was spawned by the December 2000 ruling by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)."0 Because the EEOC is a federal agency,
however, that decision was only a victory for those particular women who appealed
to the EEOC. ' Erickson, though it technically pertains only to the Bartell Drug
Company, casts a wider net in that it serves as judicial precedent." 2 Other
employees have followed Jennifer Erickson's lead, such as those of Wal-Mart," 3
American Airlines" 4 and UPS.' In the case of UPS, the matter has been settled,
and though the delivery company denied that its previous plan violated Title VII,
it agreed to offer prescription contraceptive coverage to its employees and their
dependants." 6
Though it would seem with this great tide of momentum that establishing equity
within all prescription drug plans throughout the country is the pervasive trend, the
gains that have been seen thus far have been relatively piece meal. The percentage
of plans that carry contraceptive prescription coverage is still woefully
inadequate.'
However, given the advances witnessed in the last few years, one
"0

Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275-76; EEOC Decision, supra note 12.

" More far reaching than that, however, it also represented adoption of a formal policy
by a powerful agency that is in charge of enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and more
specifically in this case, Title VII. Reinforced by Erickson, it serves to put employers on
notice of their obligations and to inform employees of their rights. That said, Title VII only
applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, which account for less than twenty
percent of all employers nationwide. Susan A. Cohen, FederalLaw UrgedAs Culmination
of ContraceptiveInsurance Coverage Campaign,GUTrMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, Oct.

2001, at 11, available at http'//www.agi-usa.org/pubs/joumals/gr0405 10.pdf.
112 It has already been cited by two published decisions, see infra notes
114 and 127, and
has certainly spurred other women to follow suit. See Cynthia L. Cooper, Women Fightfor
Insurance Equity in Court, at Work,

WOMEN'S

ENEWS, July 1, 2002, available at

http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfmi/dyn/aid/957 (last visited Jan. 23,2003) (detailing
how employees have sued CVS and Walmart, filed with the EEOC against the Wall Street
Journal and Dow Jones and Company, Inc., while Daimler-Chrysler, the Associated Press,
and Temple University have given into employee demands).
"3

Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-2755, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21025

(N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002) (certifying class action for refusal to provide health insurance
coverage for contraceptives).
...
Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:02-CV-0252-A, 2002 WL 731815, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 22, 2002) (dismissing contraceptives claim for lack of standing and noting in dicta
that "[b]y no stretch of the imagination does the prohibition against discrimination based on
'pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition' require the provision of
contraceptives").
"' EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001) (denying motion
to dismiss EEOC enforcement action based on refusal to provide health insurance coverage
for contraceptives to male employee's dependent spouse).
116 EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., No. CIV 00-2229 (D. Minn. 2001) (consent decree)
(on

file with author).
...S. 104 § 2(a), 107th Cong. (2001) ("[P]rivate insurance provides extremely limited
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would think that change is imminent. But that may not be true either. The Senate
hearing intended to raise awareness on the issue and to build upon the recent
momentum was held on September 10, 2001. It was widely anticipated that
Congress would vote on its passage soon thereafter. Of course, the world has not
been the same since, and legislative matters like EPICC took a backseat to more
important concerns. The death knell to EPICC may have been the election of a
Republican Congress in the fall of 2002. It is likely, however, that two, five or even
25 years down the road, if Congress has not acted, too many women will still face
problems in paying for contraception.
EPICC still remains by far the most effective way to ensure that all women who
have access to prescription drug care will be covered for prescription
contraceptives. The EEOC is advising employers that not only is contraceptive
equality necessary under the PDA, but they are advised to extend their coverage if
they wish to ward off potential lawsuits." 8 Though many employers are listening,
broad voluntary compliance cannot necessarily be expected, because otherwise we
would not be having this debate in the first place.
Many states do not have legislation that aids uninsured women, therefore
EPICC might be their greatest hope. However, even for those women who live in
one of the twenty states that have enacted prescription equity legislation," 9 EPICC
would be the only way to bind those who have found loopholes in a given state's
mandate, either in terms of the scope of coverage, or simply to evade the
requirement altogether. 2 '
coverage of contraceptives: half of traditional indemnity plans and preferred provider
organizations, 20 percent of point-of-service networks, and 7 percent of health maintenance
organizations cover no contraceptive methods other than sterilization ....).
"' Cohen, supra note 112, at 11. The advice was prominently displayed on the EEOC's
home web page for approximately one year after the decision. It has since given way to more
recent developments. See U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission Home Page, at
http://www.eeoc.gov (last updated Nov. 6, 2002).
1' As of January 2003, the states that require full contraceptive coverage are Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Texas, Vermont, and Washington. Sonfield, supra note 106, at 13. For a survey of the
various state requirements, see Fact Sheet, Ctr. for Reproductive Law & Policy,
Contraceptive Equity Bills Gain Momentum in State Legislatures (Sept. 2002), at
http://www.crlp.org/pubfacepicchart.html. Several states including Alaska, Florida,
Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin have bills pending. Fair Access to Contraception Project,
Planned Parenthood of W. Wash. & Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc., States with
Contraceptive Equity Bills Pending, athttp://www.covermypills.org/facts/statesbill.asp (last
visited Nov. 13, 2002). The EEOC has also acknowledged this encouraging trend. EEOC
Decision, supra note 12, at *2 n.3.
121 See, e.g., Bycott, supra note 13, at 804-05 ("The vague language of [some of the
state]
statutes seemingly allows satisfaction of the mandate through coverage of only some of the
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For example, many states give a "religious employer" the ability to opt out of
the coverage requirement if certain conditions are met. The definition of "religious
employer" varies from state to state, if defined at all, but in some cases is broad
enough to "have the potential to swallow the exemptions altogether."''2
Additionally, state contraceptive coverage mandates do not apply to those
employers who, like Bartell, self-insure their drug plans.'
Similarly situated
employers account for almost half of all workers nationwide."' Instead, selfinsurers are covered by ERISA, "a comprehensive federal act that preempts state
law to the extent it relates to employee benefit plans."' 24
Though the Erickson decision gives hope to those disheartened by the EPICC's
lack of movement from committee, it is far from settled doctrine that the PDA
encompasses contraceptive equity. Already, a judge in the Northern District of
Texas has said in dicta that "by no stretch of the imagination does the prohibition
against discrimination based on 'pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
condition' require the provision of contraceptives."' 2 5 Like Erickson,the multitude
of cases that most assuredly will be spawned by the decision will encounter many
highs and lows on the various paths that they may take through the judicial system.
EPICC would create stability for employees and employers alike and end all
speculation as to the breadth of the PDA.
THE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE AND RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS

An obvious collision of ideals occurs when a statutory requirement mandating
access to contraceptives is thrust upon the many religious employers, most notably
Catholic, that exist throughout the country. One of the Roman Catholic faith's
central tenets is that the use of contraception is a sin.' 26 On one hand, a statute can
FDA-approved contraceptive methods.") (emphasis added).
121Id. at 809; see also Cynthia Dailard, State Contraceptive Coverage Laws: Creative
Responses to Questions of 'Conscience, 'GUTrMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, Aug. 1999, at
1, 2, availableat http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/joumals/gr020401 .pdf.
2
Bycott, supra note 13, at 792-95.
3 Cohen, supra note 112, at 3-4.

supra note 13, at 792. "Because the ERISA exception that allows state
regulation of insurance, banking and securities does not reach self-insured employers,
employees with self-insured plans can only hope for mandated coverage through favorable
judicial construction of the PDA or from federal law mandating such benefits." Id. at 794
(footnotes omitted).
2' Alexander v. American Airlines, Inc., 2002 WL 731815, *4 (N.D. Tex, Apr. 22,2002)
(dismissing the plaintiff's case for lack of standing).
126 In the interest only of presenting a broad range of opinions on the subject, there are of
course other groups that find EPICC and its progeny as being insidious on moral grounds whether on the assumption that these statutes will increase sexual activity or because some
of the more common forms ofprescription birth control (like "the pill" or intrauterine devices
124 Bycott,
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address any inequality claims inherent in such a denial of coverage. On the other,
however, the First Amendment guarantees an act of Congress can neither infringe
upon the free exercise of religion nor in part operate to favor one religion over
another.
Though Erickson is the first case to deal with the issue of whether women are
entitled to contraception benefit coverage when enrolled in a drug plan, perhaps the
most contentious case currently making its way through the court system involves
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., 127 as it attempts to maneuver around the
State of California's newly created laws guaranteeing prescription benefit coverage
for female employees.'
Though the California statute offers a "conscience clause" for religious
employers that the proposed federal law does not, it is a narrowly drawn one that

(IUDs)) are seen as being abortifacients, designed to act post-conception. See, e.g., Position
Paper, Birth Control, supra note 13; Position Paper, Am. Life League, Activism: 'Pill Bill'
Is Nothing but Trouble, at http://www.all.org/activism/pbchem.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2002). These groups and arguments are not addressed by this Note, not only because they
are marginal and their arguments highly disputable, but also because morality plays no part
in First Amendment analysis. Consequently, if such an organization were to be faced with
a suit from one of their employees to provide prescription contraception benefits, they would
likely not have standing in the same way Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., would. See

infra text accompanying notes 127-63. These organizations are relegated to operating in the
legislative realm, focusing only on lobbying against EPICC.
27 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Ct.
App. 2001) review granted, 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001). In a controversial and rarely used
procedural move practiced almost exclusively in California, the California Supreme Court
ordered that the Court of Appeals decision not be cited as law until the issue is resolved by
it. See generally Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear:Depublication and
Stipulated Reversal in the CaliforniaSupreme Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033 (1993).
In his article, Barnett notes:
[T]he court in the "vast majority" of cases, orders depublication "because a
majority of the justices consider the opinion to be wrong in some significant
way, such that it would mislead the bench and bar if it remained citable as
precedent." [Former California Supreme Court] Justice Grodin added that
depublication was most frequently used when the court considered the result
correct "but regarded a potion of the reasoning to be wrong or misleading,"
though "there are times... when the supreme court considers the result to be
wrong as well."
Id. at 1035-36.
128 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West Supp. 2002) (governing health care
service plans); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West Supp. 2002) (governing disability

insurance policies). Prior to enactment, both laws were known as the Women's
Contraception Equity Act. Women's Contraception Equity Act, ch. 532, 1999 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 3017 (West), Women's Contraception EquityAct, ch. 538, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3047
(West).
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has come under fire.' 29 During the legislative process, Catholic groups sought to
include an "opt-out" provision so that they, as employers, would not facilitate what
they view as sin by being required to offer prescription coverage to their
employees. 3 0 As the Court of Appeals noted: "The Legislature sought to address
this concern without significantly undermining the anti-discrimination and public
welfare goals of the prescription contraceptive coverage statutes, and without
imposing the employers' religious beliefs on employees who did not share those
beliefs."''
The compromise that was adopted by the California legislature defined religious
employers narrowly and requires that they meet four criteria. First, the purpose of
the employer must be "[t]he inculcation of religious values."' 32 Second, the
religious employer must primarily employ persons of the same belief.'33 Third, the
religious employer must serve primarily persons of the same belief.'34 Finally, the
religious employer must be a tax exempt religious organization as described by
section 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code.' 35
Catholic Charities did not meet any of these criteria. It "d[id] not proselytize
or attempt to inculcate those it serves with its religious beliefs."' 3 6 It did not
discriminate in hiring,' 37 nor did it do so in providing services to the general
public.'3 8 And Catholic Charities was organized as a nonprofit public benefit
law is surely not the only one that has (or will) come under attack. For
example, the day after New York's Women's Health and Wellness Act was passed, allowing
"employers to get out of the requirement only for workers directly involved in religious
work," members of the Catholic Conference were already considering a challenge. Erika
129 California's

Rosenberg, Women's Health Bill Approved, J. NEWS, June 18, 2002, available at

http://www.thejoumalnews.com/newsroom/061802/18nywomen.html.
132

Catholic Charities,109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183.
Id.
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(A); CAL INS. CODE § 10123.196(d)(l)(A).

133

CAL HEALTH&SAFETYCODE§ 1367.25(b)(l)(B); CAL INS. CODE § 10123.196(d)(l)(B).

30
131

'31 CAL.HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(C); CAL INS. CODE § 10123.196(d)(1)(C).
'31 CAL HEALTH&SAFETY CODE§ 1367.25(b)(1)(D); CAL INS. CODE § 10123. 196(d)(1)(D).
Such organizations include "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or
associations of churches," I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000), and "the exclusively religious
activities of any religious order." Id. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(iii).
136 Catholic Charities,109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183.
d. In fact, seventy-four percent of its employees were not Catholic. Id.
'
138 Id. It would be interesting to see this analysis in a suit brought by teachers, and to a

lesser degree staff, of a parochial school board. Presumably, in most cases, there is a greater
percentage of Catholics employed by a school board (certainly among the teachers). So,
instead of having seventy-five percent of the employees non-Catholic, seventy-five percent
of the teachers may be Catholic, and, instead of serving a population without regard to their
faith, Catholics could very well also comprise seventy-five percent or more of the student
body. What exactly the California legislature had in mind in drawing this exception is not

known, but presumably the paradigmatic case would be something like a large parish that
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organization under section 501(c)(3) rather than section 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (ii).139
Instead of opting not to offer any drug benefits at all to its employees, Catholic
Charities filed suit arguing that the statute violates the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution 4 ' and article I, section 4 of the California
Constitution. 14'
The court in Catholic Charitiesreasoned that, although previous impingement
upon the free exercise of religion had to undergo a strict scrutiny analysis, the
United States Supreme Court's contentious ruling in Employment Division v.
Smith'42 established that "[a]n otherwise valid and constitutional law in an area in
which the state is free to regulate, which law is neutral and of general applicability,
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice."' 43 Due to the many
different beliefs that exist in our diverse society, to hold otherwise "would open the
prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind."' 44
The California Court of Appeals ruled that prescription contraceptive statutes
are valid and constitutional, based on the 1965 Supreme Court ruling of Griswold
v. Connecticut.'45 Because the statutes are applied generally and are neutral with
respect to any religious beliefs, the strict scrutiny test did not apply.'4 6 Therefore,
so long as there was any rational basis for the California legislature to enact such
a statute, which in this case was "the elimination of gender discrimination" and
"preserv[ation of] public health and well-being," the law was constitutionally
valid. "47
The court in Catholic Charitiesgave the EEOC decision great deference and

employed more than fifteen people.
.139Id. at 184.
40 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . " U.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent
with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1974).
142 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith had to do with the Native American Church
ritual of
ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. Id. at 872.
14 Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185-86 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79,
884-85, 888-90).
'44 Smith, 494 U.S. at 889.
14 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (determining that married people have a fundamental right to
obtain contraceptives).
146 Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186-87, 189.
147 id. at 187. More than merely finding a rational basis, the court recognized
these
interests as compelling. Id.
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cited Erickson as precedent.4 8 Catholic Charities contended that Gilberttipped the
balance in their favor, but the court correctly noted that the PDA amended Title VII,
and that the Supreme Court's decision in Newport News established the fact that a
decision not to fund prescription contraceptives, affecting only women, is
discriminatory.' 9 But most importantly, the court found that the Free Exercise
clause did not require a religious exemption "from this neutral and generally applied
civic obligation."' 50 In rebutting Catholic Charities' argument that this law
discriminates against the Catholic Church only, the court responded that, so long
as the legislative intent was not to burden the Catholic Church specifically, and its
general application is neutral, the law is valid."'5 The court went on to say:
[T]he object of the prescription contraceptive coverage statutes is not to
infringe upon or restrict Catholics' beliefs about contraception because
of their religious motivation, but to accommodate those beliefs to the
extent possible while protecting the rights of employees and effectuating
the legislative purpose of eliminating gender discrimination in health
insurance coverage. Some Catholic employers are exempt from the
mandate and others are not, but all religions are treated identically. The
limited exemption does not cover all religious-affiliated ancillary
organizations engaged in "secular-type" pursuits. The Catholic Church
is not the only religious entity with affiliated institutions engaged in
secular activities; therefore, it is not the only church whose affiliated
entities do not qualify as "religious employers" under the challenged
52
statutory criteria.
The argument that Catholicism is the only religion that prohibits contraception
and the only religious entity discussed by the California legislature did not move the
court. It noted that that was a product of the Catholic Church being the only one to
oppose the bill during the legislative process.'
Because the legislature
acknowledged the Church's concerns and attempted to deal with its demands, but
did not totally accede to them, did not mean there was an anti-Catholic animus
behind the passing of the bill.'54
See id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188.
o Id. at 189.
"5'
Id. at 190 (countering Catholic Charities' citationofChurch ofthe Lukumi Babalu, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which mandated heightened scrutiny "if the object
of [the] law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation.")
(quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533) (alteration in original).
152 CatholicCharities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190.
113Id. at 191.
148

14

154Id.
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Turning to Catholic Charities' additional arguments, the court was unmoved.
It was not compelled that the criteria that an organization must meet to qualify for
the religious exemption was invalid. ' It also rejected Catholic Charities' argument
that it is subject to the "ministerial exception" to Title VII because only ministers
or clergy, and not layperson employees, qualify.'56
Finally, and to no avail, Catholic Charities also argued that the statutes enacted
by the California Legislature infringed upon their right to free speech.'57 Catholic
Charities argued that, because the Catholic Church vociferously campaigns against
the use of contraception, the statutes prohibit the Church from "practicing what it
preaches." This lessens the impact of its message and undermines the Church's
authority.'
The court countered that:
The prescription contraceptive coverage statutes do not require Catholic
Charities to repeat an objectionable message out of its own mouth ....
The mere fact that coverage must be provided for certain items... is not
likely to be viewed as an endorsement of the use of these items ....
Catholic Charities remains free to advise its employees that it is morally
opposed to prescription contraceptive methods and to counsel them to
refrain from using such methods. 59
The Supreme Court of California's depublishing of the CatholicCharitiescase
before the appeal is heard might suggest that the appellate court's reliance on Smith
is somewhat dubious. The Smith decision, authored by Justice Scalia in a slim 5-4
M Id. at 192-93. The court noted that the two-part strict scrutiny test developed in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), requires strict scrutiny to be applied only "where
(1) there is a mechanism of exemptions open to unfettered discretionary interpretation, and
(2) the bureaucratic discretion is enforced in a discriminatory manner against religion."
Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. In this case there was no "unfettered
discretionary interpretation" because the exemption is very much a quantitative process with
four objective criteria being analyzed. Id. at 193.
156 Id. at 193-94.
'
Id. at 195. This argument was undoubtedly inserted to bring Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940), into the fold. In Smith, Justice Scalia wrote:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application ofa neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech
and of the press.
Employment Dir. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). He then cited to Cantwell which
involved a Jehovah's Witness proselytizer having been charged with breach of the peace for
airing his religious views on a street comer. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 300-01.
"' See Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195.
159

Id.
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majority, shifted the Supreme Court's long-established doctrine on free exercise
cases that had "requir[ed] the government to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest."' 6 ° Instead of presuming first that religious conduct
or a belief is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court following Smith finds
a neutral and generally applicable statute to be presumptively constitutional. This
outcome so angered Congress that it sought to revert back to the old doctrine via
statute when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).'6'
The possibility still exists that given in most cases where the California
Supreme Court depublishes an opinion, it does so on the basis that the end result is
correct but the analysis is flawed, the California Supreme Court may very well rule
that, under the state constitution, the government must show a compellinginterest.
Holding the government to that task, the court may then very well find that the state
has a compelling interest in preserving the public health and well-being of its
citizens and in eliminating gender discrimination. Though such a case would be
decided under the California Constitution, it may not preclude the issue from going
to the United States Supreme Court.

62

If Catholic Charitiesever reached the United States Supreme Court, there is no
telling whether it would be evaluated within the Smith framework or decided by a
majority that seeks a return to the compelling interest test. It is different from Smith
in that this is not a criminal statute that prevents someone from using an integral
part of their sacrament ritual.' 63 Instead, it is a civil statute thatforces an employer
to provide access to something that the employer believes is sinful. But whether
forcing an employer to provide access is requiring the employer to violate their
religious beliefs is an issue in-and-of itself. In the end, it is the employee's choice
as to whether she wishes to violate the employer's religious beliefs, even if she is
Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2000)). RFRA's explicit purpose was to overturn Smith and "restore the
compelling interest test." Id. § 2(b)( 1)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)( 1)). The Supreme
Court found RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states in City ofBoerne v. Flores,521
U.S. 507 (1997). Congress later amended RFRA to apply only to the federal government.
See Relgious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, §
7,2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat.) 803, 806 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2, 2000bb-3(a)
(1994)).
162 Only if the right protected under the California Constitution were broaderthan
and
independent of the right granted by the U.S. Constitution could it be preserved as a state issue
and thus prevented from being ruled on by the United States Supreme Court. See Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (requiring a clear statement of adequate and
160

161

independent state grounds to avoid federal review).

See generally G. Alan Tarr,

ConstitutionalTheory and State ConstitutionalInterpretation,22 RUTGERS L. J. 841 (1991)
(examining reliance on state constitutions as independent sources of rights).
63 See supra note 142.
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Catholic. And making the choice available does not mean that all, or any, female
employees will exercise that choice.
The presence of the statute does not infringe upon Catholic Charities' right to
exercise their religion in the same way as restricting the use of peyote infringes
upon Smith's rights; Catholic employees working for the organization can still
refuse to use contraception. A free exercise objection is, therefore, weaker
compared to an Establishment Clause argument. Again, however, there is no
evidence whatsoever that the statute has any more than an incidental effect on
Catholic Charities. Clearly the California legislature was driven to overcome the
pernicious effects of gender discrimination and the social consequences of
unplanned pregnancies, and, as an employer, Catholic Charities is not exempt from
being forced to live up to those ideals. All employers, whether they object on
religious or moral grounds, have the same responsibility.
In either the California Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, or
both, California's Attorney General may be required to demonstrate a compelling
interest if the courts find that the Women's Contraception Equity Act indeed
infringes upon Catholic Charities' First Amendment rights. As already noted, the
state interests are significant and compelling, 64 but of course it is up to each justice
to determine which one outweighs the other. However, it is difficult to make an
Establishment Clause argument that can overcome the government's interest in
promoting gender equality when eighty-one percent of Catholic women have used
oral contraception. 6 5 It would appear that Catholic women are less concerned with
their ability to exercise their religion freely than they are with their access to
contraception. Because EPICC did not, and many state equivalents to California's
Women's Contraception Equity Act do not offer religious exemptions, the Catholic
Charitiescase is an important one in providing legislative guidance.
CONCLUSION

An employer would certainly be advised to extend prescription benefit coverage
to its female employees and the female dependents of its employees simply for
equity sake. We have reached the twenty-first century, where the ideals of true
gender equality are not just a pipe-dream, but truly within grasp. But if it is the
bottom line that speaks louder than decency, in light of the very recent
developments in this area, no employer is safe from the prospect of having to defend
itself in a class action lawsuit over a matter that ultimately would have a negligible
(if not ultimately positive) impact on their cost of doing business. If an employer,
with the knowledge of recent history and in spite of the numbers, still refuses to
accept reality, it could face high legal bills in counter-productively defending itself
164

See supra note 147.
supra note 8, at 9.

165 DARROCH,
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against a morally deflated and antagonistically charged group of employees.
A great number of states have acted to extend prescription contraception benefit
coverage to the workforce, realizing that there is a multitude of social benefits to
such legislation. Further, the EEOC opinion and the Erickson decision combine to
give employees a great deal of strength in bargaining with their employers. Finally,
the Catholic Charities case simply reinforces the point and ensures that religious
employers cannot impose their own beliefs upon their own employees, especially
ones that don't even share that faith. All of these legislative enactments and cases
serve as positive authority and precedent to further extend the ideal of equality
piece-by-piece. It is still early in this debate, however, and none stand on firm legal
footing.
In the interest of saving time and resources, EPICC could have settled the
debate once and for all. It should not be left to the upper echelon of a particular
employer's managing body, regardless of the affiliation, to impose its moral
judgments on its female employees or force them to suffer from gender bias. In the
area of employee prescription benefits, we have already operated under a free
market system and the results have been less than stellar. Congress should take
advantage of the momentum and popular support for such legislation and do what
is right.' 66 Such action would achieve uniformity across the nation, not only from
state to state, but from one employer to another, and provide all women with
unfettered access to the most popular means by which they control their own
reproductive freedom.
C.Keanin Loomis

One large group of women of childbearing age that is not discussed in this Note, nor
addressed by EPICC, is students at institutions of higher learning. An informal survey
conducted by Planned Parenthood found that fifty-three percent of one hundred major
colleges and universities offered prescription drug coverage under student health care plans
but excluded contraceptives. Vox: Voices for Planned Parenthood, Planned Parenthood
Fed'n ofAm., Inc., CoverMyPills, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/vox/insurance.html
(last visited Nov. 13, 2002). Even if EPICC were passed and all female dependents of
employees were guaranteed access, it would not mean that a student's parent(s) would allow
her to get contraception under their plan or that she would feel comfortable enough doing so.
Additionally, many female students would either not qualify due to age restrictions.
According to Planned Parenthood, many universities are responding in an encouraging
fashion by voluntarily extending coverage upon being enlightened on the issue and the law.
166

